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Abstract
This is a conceptual paper that seeks to dig out some of the distinct understandings of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) and relate them to basic economic and ethical choices and theories. 
Most of the discussion is focused on enterprise choice of tax payment in a context where both 
enterprise production activities as well as their tax payment may be allocated between constituen-
cies where the state of public governance and poverty levels may differ widely. The presentation 
is non-formal, but mostly stylized and empirical information is mostly presented in the footnotes.
Jens Chr. Andvig
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) 
Corporate Social Responsibility when 
Ethical Beliefs and State of Public 
Governance vary

1. Introduction1 
In this paper I will look at some ethical issues that are relevant for the 
management of business enterprises. Several are discussed under the 
heading of corporate social responsibility (CSR). The latter also em-
braces a class of specific business expenditures or part of cost compo-
nents that sometimes may reflect ethical concerns, but that may also 
be induced by pure commercial interests. The increased interest in 
CSR in public debates, by public authorities as well as in research re-
flects the increased power and prestige of private companies and the 
declining prestige of the public organizations which are supposed to 
regulate them. A question that naturally arises is whether they are able 
to use that power to internalize eventual negative external effects of 
their commercial activities and to deliver public good and services or 
redistribute income on a voluntary basis traditionally left to public or-
ganizations or not? A number of claims that enterprises have indeed 
been able to move in that direction and that the fraction of ‘social re-
sponsible investment appears to have been increasing (Benabou and 
Tirole, 2010). They may have stimulated the interest in CSR from the 
positive end. 
 
Many of the ethical issues involved in CSR appear most acute when 
the private companies turn multinational and operate in countries with 
highly unequal income levels and/or levels of competence and honesty 
in the public sector. They are then directly confronted with the ethical 
issues that arise from an international economic order that philoso-
phers like Pogge (2008: 107) for good reasons characterize as globally 
unjust. Moreover, unlike most public organizations they may move 
part of their organizational structure and activities across countries 
and interact directly with populations at these very different income 
levels and with public authorities of different levels of competence 
and benign-ness. The lack of any corresponding international mobility 
of public officials creates regulatory lacunas that increase the need for 
voluntary compliance of public regulations.2 When located in ex-
tremely poor countries branches of multinational companies some-
times constitute islands of efficiency surrounded by mass poverty and 
                                                 
1  I will like to thank CUTS International and NUPI for economic support of this paper that 
is an off-shoot of a cooperative venture with CUTS on a project on CSR issues in the 
pharmaceutical industry and among private hospitals in India. I have benefited from dis-
cussions an introduction to the field by Rijit Sengupta and Vikash Batham at CUTS and 
by Professor Vasanthi Srinavasan at the Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore. Pro-
fessor Rune Jansen Hagen, University of Bergen, has made several wise proposals for 
how to clarify and improve the structure when refereeing the paper at Nordic Develop-
ment Economics meeting in Bergen, June 2013. Alas, I could not do them all. 
2  We have seen a weak tendency towards cross-country mobility of public officials lately. 
For example, US regulators of the pharmaceutical industry have been allowed to establish 
an office in India itself for controlling that country’s export of pharmaceutical products to 
the US. Such movement remains still quite rare, however. 
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extensive public mismanagement. The ethical questions associated 
with corporate social responsibility are raised sharply when significant 
part of the activities of multinational companies is located in countries 
where public authorities fail and mass poverty rules. Since private 
companies are playing a larger part in the international and national 
economic orders, ethical misconduct on their part becomes a more 
significant threat, increasing the interest in CSR issues.3 
 
From the negative end the interest in business ethics and CSR has 
been stimulated from the number of large business scandals occurring 
at the turn of the millennium where instances of serious misconduct 
have reached the public. Most of the well-known business scandals 
have been based on based on various forms of unethical manipulation 
of information. They appear also in various ways to be connected to 
financial deregulation that has increased the leverage for manipula-
tion. Combined with the perennial state of imperfect information pos-
sessed by the various ‘stakeholders,’ the scope for choice that makes 
some conduct ethical or not, has widened .4 Not willing to return to a 
regulatory regime that restricts the freedom of choice for private com-
panies, the cases of large scale violations of ethical conduct, raise the 
question of how to make companies follow norms of proper conduct 
and to do so voluntarily? 
2. Plan and aims of the paper  
After presenting three definitions of CSR that I will apply in various 
part of the paper, we discuss two opposite deontological views on the 
profit maximization, Milton Friedman’s and a Kantian Marxist one. 
                                                 
3  The connection between CSR and the new economic order of extreme capitalism has 
perhaps been drawn most clearly in the Indian debate about its new company law from 
2011. Here it was proposed that the larger private companies set aside two percent of its 
average profit the last three years for CSR expenditures. The payment was to be obligato-
ry but its composition the company should decide (Ministry of Corporate Affairs, 2011). 
Here an economic elite favoring a rapid expansion of private companies would force the 
companies to spend money on visible social targets as a way to propagate the new eco-
nomic order to a mostly poor and skeptical electorate more or less by instinctively looking 
for solutions by the state . 
4  Some of the leading US scandals such as the Enron and World Com scandals were char-
acterized by fraudulent estimates of profit that allowed insiders with the assistance of out-
side accounting firms to defraud outside stockowners as well as regular employees for 
their share of profits and their pensions (Krugman 2002). In the leading Indian business 
scandal, a modern IT firm, Satyam, that had World Bank as one of its customers, used the 
old “Dead Souls”-techniques well-known from defunct states: it held 13 000 imaginary 
employees in its employ and paid out their wages to themselves before assessing the prof-
its to be shared with the outside owners (Shirur, 2011). The scandal has had significant ef-
fects on the Indian debate, but the systematic defrauding by insiders sometimes with use 
of violence, such as in the case of Khodorkovsky (Black et al., 2000), has had a more ex-
tensive system-determining impact on the political legitimacy of the private companies in 
Russia. During the Russian transition several of the unethical techniques for manipulating 
financial information were transmitted to other countries like the US and were later ex-
posed during the 2008 financial crisis- despite the post-Enron reforms in corporate gov-
ernance. The Siemens scandal was of a somewhat different nature, but it showed that a 
large multinational company, using slush funds, was able to organize a systematic bribing 
of a large number of different country governments without being caught by outside mon-
itoring agencies (New York Times, December 21, 2008). 
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Since we are studying private companies and CSR, the role of profit is 
of course crucial both for the possibility of financing CSR expendi-
tures and for the scope and meaning of business ethics. Then we out-
line a Walras-like competitive system where the relevant ethical 
judgments are clearly consequential; this as a brief benchmark for the 
further discussion. While CSR expenditures make no sense in such an 
economy, enterprises (and consumers) may be taxed, and subsequent-
ly we discuss corporate tax payment and CSR. The normative ques-
tions raised here apply to all sectors since they all are potential tax 
payers while many other issues are more sector-specific, and CSR is-
sue may in fact only become interesting in a sector specific context.5  
 
With a few exceptions the paper keeps to the tradition in the literature 
to base the discussion of CSR to a typical, single enterprise. Many im-
portant normative aspects of enterprise behavior may then slips 
through the net. For example, may a cooperation (bargaining) between 
enterprises internalize external effects (the Coase theorem)? May the 
ethical significance of a given action change with the number of en-
terprises, engaging in it, and so on?  
 
The major aim of the paper is to explore the nature of the normative 
choices involved across different forms of CSR expenditures and 
across countries at different income levels and public governance ca-
pabilities for a single enterprise. It is clearly conceptual in intent and 
focuses on normative issues. References to empirical data or cases are 
mostly placed in footnotes. The discussion is informal and while styl-
ized, no explicit model will be formulated. Since most of the debates 
around CSR appear tied to very recent developments while in fact 
many of the substantial questions are quite old, I have indicated this 
by drawing on older levels of thinking both when they were following 
the same tracks as the present one, as a matter of contrast. 
 
Part of the discussion around CSR is unavoidably normative and 
hence not directly amenable to scientific analysis. Nevertheless, in or-
der to gain some form of objectivity we allow the normative assump-
tions vary. The two major ethical belief systems applied here are 
known as deontological and consequentialist ( to be outlined). Given 
our emphasis on cross-country responsibilities, it is reassuring that this 
distinction itself may be cross-cultural. According to Amartya Sen 
(2010: 23 -24) the distinctions between these two forms of ethical rea-
soning are, for example, well known by students of Hinduism and in 
                                                 
5  For example, in the pharmaceutical industry an important ethical issue is whether present 
patenting harming today’s poor should be kept in the interest of potential new medicines 
for future generations. In the case of the oil industry it is the opposite. Should the present 
generation gain through its resource extraction on the cost of depleted resources for future 
generations? 
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the cultural environments in which Indian-located enterprises operate 
in.6 
3. CSR defined – from normative and decision–making points 
of view 
I will in the following define CSR in three different ways. The first 
one, the A-definition is openly normative. The second, B-definition 
focuses on business (mis)conduct and the third on cost and expendi-
tures. 
 
Definition A: CSR embraces all set of actions, rules or principles of 
action a corporate leadership may follow or induce among their em-
ployees to make the enterprise conducts its business in an ‘ethical’ 
way. Note here that whether a corporate leadership displays ethical 
conduct or not is not only a question of private, individual ethics of 
individual business leaders. The leadership is responsible for allocat-
ing decision-making powers including the geographical localization of 
its activities, information-streams internally as well as externally. The 
same applies to other enterprise efforts to influence or try to avoid in-
fluencing its external social, economic, biological and social environ-
ment through price-setting, pollution control, lobbying and other 
means. An additional responsibility is to design an incentive structure 
and try to induce the motivation that goes together with it. The incen-
tive structure may stimulate or prevent ethical misconduct.7 It follows 
from the definition that what is meant by an ‘ethical’ action needs to 
be specified. Competing ethical principles such as the different deon-
tological and consequential ethical systems may yield different exten-
sions of the definition. In the following we will mainly discuss either 
rather simplified consequentialist or deontological8 arguments. At this 
                                                 
6  According to Sen, Krishna, Arjuna’s advisor, argues that it is Arjuna’s duty to fight what-
ever the consequences while Arjuna himself is more concerned with the bloodshed and 
misery (the consequences)caused by any fighting to the end.  
7  An example of the former is to tie the rewards of the local leadership of a multinational 
company tightly to the success of gaining concessions in a highly corrupt country. Know-
ing that local leaderships located in highly corrupt countries on average perform corrupt 
acts more frequently than other decision-making points of a multinational concern, the in-
centive structure here induces misconduct, although it is the local leadership that performs 
it. The role of incentive structures is often neglected in the anti-corruption polices of pri-
vate and public enterprises. 
8  Deontological ethics is often defined as an ethical system based on the idea that the ethi-
cal subjects should be judged on the basis of the degree to which they obey the norms as-
signed to them (‘deon’ means obligation or duty). More generally, it is the kind of mo-
tives that guide their conduct, not the consequences of their actions that define the ethical 
content of the actions as well as the ethical status of the subjects making them. Obviously, 
what kind of motives that are considered ethical may lead to different systems of deonto-
logical ethics: duty to some organizational entities; non-harming or love may lead to quite 
different normative judgments than duty considerations. Sometimes deontological sys-
tems may be defined over sets of actions so than an act may be ethically wrong or right 
whatever the motive for it or its consequences.  
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stage we may consider the definition to consist of the union of all the 
conceivable ethical systems.9  
 
Definition B: A company displays CSR behavior when not engaging in 
any business misconduct. – Presumably this is a more operational def-
inition than definition A) and can be specified by a list of business 
misconduct such as: corruption, fraud, exploiting children, engaging 
mafias, joining illegal cartels, non-compliance of public laws, public 
rules or standards; and so on. The longer this list, the more narrow (or 
precise) wills the definition of CSR become since more forms of be-
havior then are defined as non-CSR. It is more operational than B) 
since it does not have to define what is ethical. For example a number 
of public standards or laws may themselves be considered unethical 
and the authorities themselves not legitimate, so any violation of these 
rules may not be unethical, but they still may represent some form of 
business misconduct.10 
 
Definition C:  CSR embraces i) all expenditures and extra costs that a 
company voluntarily incurs for a public end. Normally, ii) part of its 
net income is sacrificed in the short or medium term to achieve these 
aims. Like A) the C) definition is defined positively: it is something 
the enterprises do that makes them (or their actions) socially responsi-
ble. The expenditure part is in principle not too difficult to make oper-
ational and several lists of observable components of activities to include in 
a social responsibility vector 
11
 have been presented and applied in em-
pirical work.12 Among the public ends that have received the greatest atten-
tion in the debates about CSR, is the effect of a company’s actions on its 
natural environment. Somewhat more difficult to observe is the cost 
component since it will have to embrace all forms of costs that the en-
terprise voluntarily incur to improve the conditions of its workforce, 
                                                 
9  Hence if even if action x is ethical according to ethical system S, but non-ethical accord-
ing system R it belongs to our class of ethical actions. 
10  This may be of particular relevance for our focus on taxation since many companies may 
consider some tax laws as unethical and the authorities of at least some countries as ille-
gitimate. 
11  A typical list is presented in Margolis et al (2008) and embraces charity, environmental 
performance, regulatory misdeeds, and transparency of company information together 
with a number of other items. 
12  Most of the classifications and resulting measurement of CSR aspects of expenditures and 
inputs have been left to external commercial or non-profit NGOs. Their numbers have 
mushroomed and their measurement ‘products’ are of varying quality. Schäfer et al 
(2006) present a descriptive overview. Many indices are mainly meant for prospective 
‘ethical’ investors or consumers so they may take various ethical aspects into considera-
tion when investing or purchasing. Others are mainly to be used to guide the local man-
agement about the situation in their enterprise. They may even be applied by the public 
authorities when granting the enterprise licenses to produce. The most frequently applied 
in econometric research is based on a set of indices developed by the research firm Kind-
er, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics (the KLD index). Their measurements are 
now incorporated among the indices owned by MSCI Inc. It is based on observations 
(constructed as ratings) from a collection of larger US enterprises. Like many of the other 
ratings it includes a number of different ‘social’ components ranging from human rights 
to environmental issues. The rankings are highly subjective and the enterprises considered 
are rated much in the manner known from the financial rating of Moody’s an others  -
from AAA and downwards.  
10 Jens Chr. Andvig 
reduce the negative externalities of its activities and increase its posi-
tive externalities alone or in cooperation with other enterprises in its 
industry over and above what follows from legal compliance.13  
 
The second part of the definition is most helpful for the study of the interac-
tion between private companies and public authorities. If the companies have 
no choice or it is in their own private interest to follow a public regulation, it 
is unreasonable to regard compliance as a form of CSR behavior. In order to 
estimate the size of the extra costs in defining its contribution to the relevant 
public end, the difference between the cost of actual and the minimum level 
of compliancy the company may get away with is a reasonable measure, but 
somewhat difficult to operationalize.  
 
Definition C) is tailor-made for studying tax payment and CSR ex-
penditure choices of private companies. The well attested phenome-
non of tax avoidance even in countries with the best public monitoring 
capabilities indicate that the difference between actual tax payment 
and the lowest possible tax payment may be a matter of choice for 
private companies, so when some pay more, it should become an im-
portant item of any social responsibility vector. Even in countries with 
the highest public efficiency levels this possibility arises. Presumably, 
the income difference between the (legal) tax avoidance tax and the 
actual tax is spent on some public end, so from the private company’s 
point of view this part of its tax payment should be considered against 
the other forms of social expenditures and as part of its portfolio of 
social responsibility actions and expenditures. 
 
The second part of the definition may nevertheless be somewhat con-
troversial since many  authors argue that corporate socials responsibil-
ity expenditures actually increase corporations’ net incomes, at least 
in the longer run and have made some empirical evidence for the 
claim.14 For some normative intuitions a definition that emphasizes 
some form of sacrifice of profits as definition C) ii) does, appears rea-
sonable. If the motivation is simply the profits of the company you 
manage and not any public end, that action may not count as a socially 
responsible one. Without sacrifice of profits the proper social motiva-
tion may appear not genuine. Tax payment above what the company 
may get away with, satisfies the sacrifice condition. 
 
                                                 
13  In the CSR literature ‘compliance’ may either refer to adherence to public regulations or 
to a wide range of voluntary standards developed by a number of NGOs, independent 
public agencies or enterprise associations. 
14  In an article that summarizes much of this research till late 2007 (Margolis et al, 2008) 
finds that there is  on average a weak positive relationship between the enterprises’ social 
responsibility indicators and their financial results. The causality may go in both direc-
tions, but appears to be stronger (quite plausibly) from financial results to CSR activities 
than the other way around, so a positive association may be quite compatible with a sacri-
fice since presumably more profitable enterprises can afford to spend more on CSR.. 
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Returning to tax payment regarded as part of a portfolio of social re-
sponsibility expenditures, the company would ideally have to compare 
the expected value of the different components; that is, it would have 
to compare: 
 
i. The expected value of the additional government –managed 
public goods and services that the extra tax payment may give 
rise with  
ii. Its own-managed delivery of public goods and services. It may 
spend resources on improving the conditions for its own work-
ing force above the levels dictated by market competition and 
government regulation, establish its own schools and worship 
buildings, or supply some of its goods or services to poor cus-
tomers below market price, and so on ,  
iii. Or outsource these activities to specialized institutions whether 
they are private companies or non-governmental organizations, 
NGOs. 
 
 The choice will be influenced by a host of factors. It will lead us too 
far to go into details here, but clearly the different signaling and at-
tributes of the choices will be of importance: What will the outside 
world know about the company’s contributions to the society? How 
may the company assess the actual effects of the social expenditures 
in the different cases? In case a channeling through government is 
considered, the efficiency and integrity of the relevant governmental 
apparatuses would of course also have to count. 
 
The precondition for making any choice between the various options 
of social expenditures on a sustainable basis is that the company has 
the income available, that it at least operates with what Alfred Mar-
shall (1920) once called positive quasi-rent, that is, the price of the 
company’s output will have to be above its short run average costs. 
Hence, the quasi-rent defines the maximum income that may be taken 
out of one of the company’s plants that could possibly be spent on so-
cial aims without impairing the running of the plant.15 
4. Are profit-making and CSR incompatible? 
Profit seeking is the major underlying principle guiding private com-
pany behavior. Is this principle compatible with any (other) form of 
social responsibility for the enterprise leadership? And what is the eth-
ical status of this principle itself? Here we may find some widely dif-
ferent views: 
                                                 
15  The reason why we invoke the old Marshallian notion of quasi-rent is that we will touch 
(briefly) some older neo-classical theories where net profit may become zero but quasi-
rents positive.   
12 Jens Chr. Andvig 
 
A) Profit is intrinsically valuable and should not be tampered 
with. In a famous article Milton Friedman (1970) argued that 
private corporations in “free-enterprise system” have no social 
responsibilities but profit-making. His discussion was focused 
on our definition C) of CSR when its ii) clause is included. 
Firstly, a business is an organization and cannot have any re-
sponsibilities, only people can, he rightly observed.16 Second-
ly, the only responsibility business managers may have is to 
maximize profits for their owners under ruling legal restraints. 
If they spend money on some unnecessary social expenses, 
they would steal from their owners, an irresponsible act. Only 
the owners could legitimately indulge in such out-payments, 
and then only in their private capacity. The major thrust in the 
argumentation against CSR in this essay was based on the 
leadership’s (top management and eventual majority owners) 
duty towards the owners as a group; that is it was at the first 
level a kind of deontological ethical argument. The ethical le-
gitimacy of the owners’ claim to the profits was not spelled 
out, but he referred to the efficiency of the “free-enterprise 
private-property system” that is a kind of consequentialist ar-
gument. Since Friedman does not qualify the responsibility to 
group of owners in the case where the company is in a monop-
oly situation and where its profit is based on monopoly (or 
monopsony) prices, the deontological argument against CSR 
trumps the efficiency argument. 
 
B) Profit-seeking is intrinsically unethical and based on private 
greed. This is an old populist argument that is based on the 
motivation of the leadership. If this motivation is a precondi-
tion for actually gaining profit, a private company would be 
unable to display any CSR according to our definitions A) and 
B), but CSR defined by C) is possible if one relax the condi-
tion that profits have to be sacrificed (the ii) clause) and that 
one allows a consequence based definition. A moral trade-off 
between the intrinsic evilness of greed against the good conse-
quences would then have to be made. Since it here is profit- 
seeking as a motive that is unethical, profits as such might be 
ethically defensible; for example if a scientist wants to test out 
                                                 
16  This is a rather trivial point in most cases and applies also of course to public organiza-
tions. Usually when considering CSR we are thinking about the behavior and ethical is-
sues involved in leadership behavior. With significant disagreements within the leadership 
including the major owners, however, the actual aggregate corporate behavior may reflect 
the norms of no-one. Nevertheless external observers may hold ethical opinions about ag-
gregate leadership behavior as well whether consistent or not as they may opinionate 
about the behavior of the single leaders separately including judgments about their disa-
greements. I will not try to explore this further, however, and only consider CSR for cen-
tralized business units – as is done in most of the CSFR literature.   
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an innovation in real life and gains considerable profits from it.
 
17
 In situations where capitalist ownership is unavoidable, it 
would be more acceptable – along this line of ethical thinking 
– if corporate management reinvested the profits in new pro-
ductive lines of activity rather than distributing it to the own-
ers. CSR implies investment in this case. To keep as much as 
possible internally for social investment would fall in the same 
category. Note that the implication here is the opposite of  
Friedman’s: the least ethical act will be to hand over profits to 
the owners for their private consumption.
18
 For completely dif-
ferent reasons both the Friedman’ite and the socialist-inspired 
analyses will tend to relegate CSR activities to the periphery of 
corporate management decision fields. 
 
C) Profits are unethical, but profit-seeking are not a matter of 
ethical choice; hence it makes no sense to raise deontological 
arguments against it. This is a kind of Marxian position.
19
 
Strictly speaking, Marx would not argue that profit-making is a 
matter of ethics at all, but just the outcome of blind economic 
laws characterizing the capitalist stage of development. Since 
profits are based on exploitation (and Marx’s analyses are 
permeated by moral indignation of it – cf. Luke (1985)), but 
since the company leaderships are obliged to follow the laws 
of competition, the conclusion appears close to Friedman’s: 
CSR and capitalism is not in general compatible. To explain 
any observed CSR- like expenditures, however, Marxists may 
be tempted to apply some functional explanations: CSR drawn 
from profits may at a certain stage of development be used in 
order to defend private profitmaking, that is, it may have good 
                                                 
17  Many within the same tradition considered competition to be sufficiently lax to allow 
other more ethical motivations to rule. In fact profit-seeking was unnecessary for efficient 
company. Profits should be taxed away by the state and distributed to the population at 
large, or the enterprises should be nationalized or become worker managed. The two first 
possibilities were emphasized by state-friendly socialists while the latter was part of the 
views of the early utopian socialists. Regarding the latter Robert Owen (1771 – 1858) was 
a particularly important forerunner for present CSR- thinking and practices. The overrid-
ing aim of his New Lanark enterprise was to maximize the community welfare including 
the welfare and freedom of its enterprise workers. The whole surplus should in fact be de 
disposed for the public welfare; to be spent on a kind of CSR strategy much more exten-
sive than anything considered among present CSR strategies.  
18  A major ethical work modernizing a Marxiss conception of exploitation is Roemer 
(1982). In practical daily activities similar ethical feelings often arise among enterprise 
employees: to have worked with something for a while gives feelings of ownership rights. 
Out of fashion should not imply any wholesale dismissal of an approach. What is consid-
ered beautiful, change also in academic contexts. A strong recommendation of taking 
Marxist approaches seriously is A. Sen (1987). 
19  The key ethical issues in Marxist thought are of course more macro-oriented and oriented 
towards the question of systemic change, and by what means that were legitimate to bring 
it about. What scope of choice the single company may have regarding CSR expenditures 
may be considered outside the orbit of Marxian analyses. The remarks here are Marxist-
inspired, however, but would are unlikely to be accepted by committed Marxists who 
would refuse to make any ethical judgments of this kind. .We may find judgments of re-
lated kind by revisionists like Kautsky and neo-Kantian Marxists.  
14 Jens Chr. Andvig 
consequences in the short run but negative ones in the long run 
if they thereby delay a desirable social revolution.20 
5. A Walras-inspired full information benchmark 
Friedman’s discussion of CSR and the “free-enterprise private-
property system” was based on a specific view of private ownership 
rights, and not on the leading neoclassical modeling of that system: 
the Walras-Arrow-Debreu models of competitive general equilibrium. 
There were good reasons for that. These models are too abstract to be 
really appropriate for discussing CSR as defined by definition C), and 
they are not committed to any specific normative view regarding 
property rights. Nevertheless, I will use them –in a very loose and par-
tial way – to create a benchmark for our following discussion. Most 
economists are likely to begin any exploration of CSR here. While too 
abstract for most purposes when analyzing CSR issues, we may never-
theless reasonably impute a view on CSR from them that resemble 
Friedman’s regarding the main conclusion, but it follows along a very 
different normative route. 
 
Here firms are organizations that have as their main task and respon-
sibility to society to transform inputs into outputs as economically as 
possible. In a market economy that implies profit maximization as 
goal. Hence under the ideal conditions of free competition
21
 CSR is 
either non-existing or simple in principle: It is to maximize profits. If 
the government so wishes, however, it may tax away the profit and 
spend it on socially desirable ends (or take over the ownership of the 
assets – market socialism). Only the government needs to make the 
ethically difficult decisions, usually represented by a central welfare 
function. A well-known result here is that the normative ideals repre-
sented by any given welfare function could be achieved by a free 
competition economy too (given a number of well- known assump-
tions we will not discuss here) where profit maximization is an im-
portant behavioral building block. 
 
To achieve maximum welfare a transfer of income between consum-
ers is normally necessary. To achieve that the center would have to be 
able to tax some consumers, ideally by a set of lump-sum taxes on 
                                                 
20  Luke (1985: 147) interprets Marxian ethical thought as based on long run consequential-
ism (with a very low or even negative discount factor when applied to the present). Today 
pharmaceutical companies use the same form of long run consequentialism when they de-
fend the right of patenting life-giving medicines. 
21  In the debate that followed Walras it was demonstrated early on ( by Barone in 1908) that 
given the conditions of free competition, government ownership of all productive equip-
ment would make now difference. As late as in 1970 this was the established view in aca-
demic economics that Oscar Lange in 1937 had demonstrated the case for a Walrasian so-
cialist market economy, but it has later been made quite clear that this result was based on 
unrealistic assumptions about the information generated, Hayek’s critique at this point 
which was first discarded, has later become accepted (Lavoie, 1985). 
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consumers’ income (such as profits) that would not disturb the delib-
erations of the consumers and firms. One such form of tax would be a 
lump sum tax on profits. Note that in this kind of economy where all 
prices as well as all sold and bought quantities are known and the 
prices parametrically set, the center would have perfect information 
about the size of profits. No tax avoidance or any form of choice re-
garding tax payments is possible given this distribution of knowledge. 
This will be our benchmark situation. 
 
Returning to the normative aspects of the situation we note that unlike 
the Friedman view which could either be based on a rights-based eth-
ics or on a consequentialist argumentation, the Walras approach here 
is based on consequentialist argumentation only. The motive, profit 
maximization, may not be either good nor bad by itself,
22
 but since 
any other form of motivation are likely to lead to less good conse-
quences in terms of economic efficiency and consequently to lower 
welfare. Hence any other form of enterprise behavior will not be CSR 
according to this consequentialist interpretation of definition A) or B). 
 
This is not the only or maybe not even the most realistic way to link 
profit maximization to CSR, however. When firms are just profitmak-
ing machines, it may be reasonable  to discuss CSR decisions as the 
outcome of a two stage decision process: first maximize profit. Then 
decide how to spend that profit. Regarding the expenditure decisions 
at the second stage all kinds of assumptions regarding leadership aims 
may be considered, including purely altruistic ones. In much of the 
following we will discuss CSR as expenditure decisions23 at this sec-
ond stage, that is, we will apply definition C). 
 
From this benchmark situation we will loosen some assumptions and 
explore whether its conclusions regarding the desirability and forms of 
the CSR behavior are likely to change. First we will loosen the as-
sumption of a single authority state, since an important underlying 
interest is in what constitutes multinational ethical company behavior 
when the international order is potentially unjust. Then we explore 
whether the Walras model’s result regarding the ethics of the division 
of labor between government and companies may hold when govern-
ment may not be fully informed about the size of the enterprises’ prof-
                                                 
22  In developing his analyses of consequentialism Parfit (1984: 26) suggests that the ethical 
status of motives may derived from its consequences: “(C5) The best possible motives are 
those of which it is true that, if we have them, the outcome will be best.” This may, for 
example apply to profit maximization in some situation like free competition s, but not 
all. 
23  While possible, cost decisions (such as paying wages above market rates in poor envi-
ronments) and sales decisions (such as selling life-saving medicines below market rates), 
as components of a CSR strategy are more difficult to separate from profit maximization 
in a second stage without violating the profitmaking norms of behavior in the first stage. 
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its and finally we look at the CSR consequences of profit-making 
when competition rules change.  
6. CSR in a free competition multi-constituency case with 
equal tax rates 
Here we consider an enterprise that operates plants in several political 
constituencies under free competition (FC) conditions. As before all 
inputs and output are homogenous, prices known, but the prices as 
well as technology may differ across the constituencies. The only tax 
is profit tax. In this section we will (unrealistically) assume that the 
tax rate is the same in all constituencies. The authorities are able to 
costless assess the taxes to be paid in each constituency, and no tax 
avoidance is possible in either. 
 
In the case when the enterprise is unable to shift income from one 
constituency to another, the CSR issue is unchanged. Both a Walras 
socialist and Friedman will tell the plant leaderships to do the same as 
before: maximize profits. When some profit income may be trans-
ferred across constituencies, some non-trivial ethical choices may 
have to be made, however.24 In case the transfer is costless, and profits 
transferred to another country are only taxed in the receiving country, 
profit maximization will not decide where to locate the profit to be 
taxed. Another normative principle in addition to efficiency will be 
needed. Since the ownership group is the same, Friedman’s principle 
of ownership rights will not determine the location of profits either. If 
all owners are located in one country and we assume it is more costly 
for citizens of one country to spend their income in any other, all prof-
its will be transferred to the owners’ country, if Friedman’s principle 
is applied. 
 
 Some socialist variation of the idea that a company is mainly respon-
sible to the producers is another way to determine the location of prof-
its. The profit should then stay in the country where it is produced, 
and so should the taxes imposed on it and therefor the public goods 
that these taxes pay for should also be delivered in the country where 
the profit originated.25 Behind this socialist notion that value of pro-
                                                 
24  The large number of well documented cases of tax avoidance (for example the ones in the 
UK recently: Pfizer (Guardian 30 Jan, 2011), Google (The Independent, June 28, 2013), 
Starbuck (The Independent, Jan 5, 2012, etc.) illustrates the wide scope of choice for relo-
cation of profits across constituencies for multinational companies. The point here is not 
tax avoidance as such since in the hypothetical situation outlined above in this section it is 
impossible. But the empirical fact of profit relocation among multinational companies re-
vealed under more realistic conditions indicates that the ethical dilemma stylized here is a 
pertinent one.  
25  The same outcome would of course arise with either Walras or the Friedman assumptions 
in the case of transfer costs such as taxes on income transferred abroad or higher financial 
costs on foreign transfers.. Joint profit maximization will then tell the profits to stay 
where they arise.  
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duction should belong to its producers there is an implied notion of 
desired egalitarianism. All directly involved are necessary for the out-
come. Egalitarianism will not generally lead to this result across coun-
tries, however. 
 
Assuming realistically that substantial difference of income levels 
across the different constituencies exists. Let us now and in the fol-
lowing assume that one plant is located in a rich constituency, an R-
state. The owners of the enterprise are also citizens of R. The other is 
located in a poor constituency, a P-state. Then a utilitarian and conse-
quence oriented ethics will recommend a CSR strategy where the en-
terprise allocates the largest share of its taxable net income to the P-
state so the authorities there may receive a large share of the tax and 
accordingly receive a larger share of public goods and services that 
the taxation of the profit may give rise to. This will give a higher total 
utility (if we add some assumptions about cardinal utility and declin-
ing marginal utility of income). 
 
This argument assumes that the political constituencies may not trans-
fer tax incomes between themselves, that is, we disregard the possibil-
ity of foreign aid. If they are able to do so, however, the enterprise 
needs to take that into account the possibility of cross country public 
transfers in its CSR strategy. In this simple case when both constitu-
encies operate with the same tax rate, the enterprise may simply allo-
cate all taxable income to the R-state and let the public authorities 
there divide its tax income between R-state use and foreign aid to the 
P-state authorities. We are here back to the old division suggested in 
the Walras approach: decentralize economic decisions, centralize the 
ethical ones. 
 
Note that this presupposes that the owners really belong to the R-
constituency, are citizens there and accept the R-authority allocation 
of tax income between the R-and P-constituencies. If they are genu-
inely cosmopolitans or the ownership contain members from a P-
country, the ownership group may be divided and the location of prof-
its across constituencies may be decided by bargaining inside the 
ownership group but where the preferences are influenced by the pub-
lic transfer flows between the R- and P country. Here the enterprise 
ownership group may disagree with the public arrangement and do its 
own allocation of taxable income between the constituencies.26 
                                                 
26  We may generally expect that the company ‘welfare’ function (over the profit expendi-
tures) will consider the utility of mainly its owners, but also its employees and citizens in 
both countries while the two state welfare functions may or may not do so. 
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7. CSR in the FC, multi-constituency case with unequal tax 
rates  
Here the Friedman CSR instruction is clear: allocate all income to the 
country with the lowest tax rate. Anything else will be to steal profits 
from the owners. Ethical complexities are more difficult to avoid for 
the Walras approach, however. Profit maximization will lead the en-
terprise to allocate as much as possible of the income to the constitu-
ency with the lowest tax rate in the same way as for the Friedman en-
terprise. If this is an R-state this implies that all profits and taxes will 
go to the R-country. Or more realistically, the prevalence of areas with 
exceptionally low tax rates, the tax havens, implies that profit maxi-
mization implies that company leaderships should locate as much of 
the profit as legally possible there. These are mostly constituencies 
with small local populations, mostly with medium or high incomes 
compared to a P-country. 27 Hence, their prevalence implies that less 
tax will be paid in P-countries (as well as in R-countries) by multina-
tional companies.28 If a company’s CSR strategy is based on enter-
prise preferences over profit expenditures that give some weights to 
the welfare of the population in the poor country. What then to do? It 
may either 
 
i. accept the profit loss involved when letting a larger share be 
taxed in the P constituency than the one yielding maximum 
profit, which implies that it voluntarily gives away some in-
come to the authorities in P,  
ii. it may spend part of the profit by developing do-good activities 
in P on its own, or 
iii. it may transfer funds to specialized do-good organizations 
supplying some form of services to citizens of in a P-state 
where some of its profit arose. 
iv. I will return to the considerations that may influence the choice 
of CSR strategies in this context. 
 
                                                 
27  For example, at present between 80 to 90% of foreign direct investment (FDI) to India has 
been flowing through Mauritius (Wall Street Journal, March 22, 2010). A major cause of 
this flow has been a tax agreement with India and Mauritius and the absence of capital 
gain taxation in Mauritius. This form of tax avoidance has been legal (although some-
times challenged). At times it has caused tax avoidance in both India and a capital-
exporting country, which in most cases is India itself. In a dynamic context a possible eth-
ical defense of this form of tax avoidance is consequence oriented: it may have contribut-
ed to economic growth. In a static case the Friedman’s argument about the property right 
may apply.  
28  Considerable tax avoidance efforts have been documented for both mining (The Guardi-
an, April 15, 2011) and sugar companies (The Guardian, February 9, 2013) in Zambia. 
While we are not focusing on tax avoidance in this section since it presuppose imperfect 
information, its prevalence testifies to the fact that multinational companies have an ethi-
cal choice to make regarding how much they should pay in taxes in poor countries. 
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8. CSR and tax payment with imperfect income assessments  
Under imperfect information of profits and taxable income, the ethical 
choice set for corporate management widens. Dishonesty becomes a 
possibility and the ethical handling of information an important part of 
corporate management. Imperfect information raises more immediate 
issues for the A) and B) definitions of CSR than for the C) definition. 
The extreme case of lying is a classical problem in ethics since Kant 
(the A) definition). Lying is an important component in many forms of 
business misconduct such as fraud and corruption (the B) definition). 
More generally, unethical handling of information has also impact on 
the portfolio of CSR expenditures (definition C) mainly through its 
impact on tax payment. 
  
Unlike the transparent FC situations so far assumed, most companies 
operate under conditions where they may manipulate the size of prof-
its through management of the information about the size and timing 
of its various income- and cost components. One of the purposes for 
doing so is tax minimization.29 How the enterprise presents its income 
data for the different tax authorities then naturally becomes part of its 
ethical agenda: What will be its corporate social responsible way of 
revealing its taxable income? Moreover, the public authorities here 
have to choose allocation of taxable income that between countries 
with softer or stricter monitoring. The choice here will obviously be 
influenced by the technical capabilities and the motivation of the pub-
lic officials. At the positive (non-normative) end actual enterprise tax 
payments becomes part of solutions to games played out between the 
enterprises and the authorities in each country.30  
 
In one sense, ethically the situation may not be so different from the 
situation with several constituencies with different tax rates, except i) 
                                                 
29  We have already noted that profits may also be fraudulently maximized in some situations 
as displayed in the scandals of Enron, WorldCom and others in the early 2000s. In the 
case of Enron the enterprise had capitalized overestimated future profits flows (mainly 
through underestimated expenses) into the current bottom line. This overestimated income 
assessment could then be cashed in when selling stocks. The other US fraud cases out-
lined by Krugman (2002) vary in how stock and flow variables are intermingled, but the 
point in all these cases is an overestimation of profits that can be cashed in as high stock 
values at a certain point of time by sections of corporate leadership and a sub-groups of 
owners. In the Satyam case profits were underestimated by the insiders not in order to re-
duce tax expenditures but in order to steal income via fraudulent wage expenses that went 
into the insiders’ accounts. Profits when defined the same way cannot of course not simul-
taneously be maximized and minimized as part of profit-.making strategies, but the point 
here is that accounting complexities give scope for income manipulation, often accompa-
nied by tax avoidance, that companies may use illegally to their advantage.  
30  A clear and early exposition of how the interaction between different authorities and larg-
er enterprises should be analyzed with game theoretical apparatuses (cooperative and non-
cooperative) is analyzed in a general way in chapter 2 of Leif Johansen’ s classic lectures 
in macroeconomic planning ( Johansen, 1977). Unlike most other regulation games, the 
enterprises and the authorities have only opposite immediate interests in tax payment 
games (as long as they play their roles), while in most other regulation games they have 
both opposite and common interests. Since the typical enterprise here has the immediate 
opposite interest of the government here, it is an interesting testing ground for CSR be-
havior.  
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that the problem that profit maximization behavior may now also give 
rise to deliberate tax manipulation also in the single constituency case, 
ii) it may give scope for behavior bordering on or crossing the sphere 
of legality. This raises another traditional CSR issue: compliance. The 
weaker the monitoring strength of the authorities and the larger the 
scope for manipulation of taxable income in the industry in question, 
the larger is the scope for not complying with the tax rules, but also 
the potential share of actually paid taxes in the CSR expenditure port-
folio. To comply with the rule with weak monitoring becomes more 
clearly part of CSR compared to a case where compliance may not be 
much a matter of choice. 
 
 In the multi-constituency case the enterprise allocation of taxable in-
come may now not only be influenced by tax rates, but also by the 
monitoring strength of the public authorities. This is likely to favor P-
states with respect to the cross constituency allocation of taxable in-
come since whatever the formal tax rates, less income is likely to be 
taxed in a P-state if a company will minimize its tax payments; on the 
other hand relative weak monitoring capacity implies that P-states will 
loose a larger share of the income that should accrue to them. Exten-
sive corruption in the tax administration will imply that the advantage 
of low monitoring capabilities will be (at least partially) lost, and 
eventually altruistic motives for allocate the taxable income to a P-
country will be lost.  
 
While imperfect income assessment does not necessarily imply drastic 
changes in what a CSR strategy implies with respect to taxes com-
pared to the multi-constituency case with different tax rates, the in-
creased scope for tax avoidance is also increasing the area of ethical 
choice across the countries. It leaves a multinational company a larger 
scope of choice regarding its CSR portfolio: how much should it allow 
itself to be taxed and in which country? Here it also becomes clear 
how handling of information becomes an important part of the CSR 
strategy: what are socially responsible ways to emit information from 
the activities of business enterprise? 
 
Imperfect income assessments raise not only ethical question with re-
spect to authorities, but also with respect to owners of the enterprise, 
or sub-groups among them. Here the accounting choices that have 
been opened up with recent liberalization of the financial industry 
have increased the scope for income assessment manipulations and 
made them more profitable, but some efforts have been made to re-
duce the possibilities again; particularly in the direction of protecting 
minority owners.31  
                                                 
31  New legislation has been added to the company laws in a number of countries. For exam-
ple,  the Ministry of Corporate Affairs in India has made a series of proposals to deal with 
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9. Avoidance of tax avoidance vs. other items on a CSR port-
folio32 
I have argued that particularly in situations where income assessments 
are imperfect may an enterprise choose to pay more taxes than would 
be the outcome when maximal efforts on tax avoidance is expended. 
The difference between the minimum tax and actual tax paid may be 
considered as CSR expenditure assuming that the actual tax paid fol-
lows more closely the intention of the lawmakers. If so the difference 
fits well with, for example the CSR definition of the Commission of 
the European Communities that (Beltratti (2005: 377) “defines CSR as 
a concept by which ‘companies decide voluntarily to contribute to a 
better society and a cleaner environment.” 33 Presumably at least part 
of the resulting extra tax income will be spent on some public goods 
or services that otherwise will not be forthcoming or would have to be 
paid by others. An additional effect is that if a reputable business en-
terprise makes large efforts on tax avoidance, it signals irresponsibility 
to a wider audience that may copy the behavior. It is possible that the 
enterprises when determining its CSR expense portfolio are mainly 
considering the likely public good consequences of its investments. If 
so, a rational determination of a CSR portfolio would then be to invest 
so that the expected marginal rate of return on each item in the portfo-
lio, including the results from the voluntary tax payment, should be 
roughly equal.34  
 
We only considered payments to a single authority when we discussed 
variation in tax assessments. The underlying issue is, however, what 
multinational companies should do when operating in countries with 
wide variation in in poverty levels and public efficiencies. How 
should they spread their eventual CSR portfolio across items and 
countries? Generally, for a given monitoring strength and poverty lev-
el the less of public goods and the more of public harm a country‘s 
authorities may supply, the less of its income should the company al-
low to be taxed in that country. When the state apparatus in the P-state 
is ineffective and corrupt, tax avoidance here may not cause a corre-
sponding decline in public good or services. The evaded tax may then 
get a better effect for the citizens in the P constituency if the company 
uses its own organizational apparatus to provide public goods and ser-
                                                 
this problem in its Company Law proposal of 2011 after the Satyam scandal (accessible at 
the ministry’s web page).  
32  Christensen and Murphy (2004) are one of the relatively few studies that bring tax pay-
ment into the CSR field although they have more focus on the wider issues related to tax 
avoidance rather than CSR.  
33  The ethical attitudes to the state vary, of course. Anarchists and libertarians may consider 
all state activities as illegitimate and hence consider even the voluntary part of tax pay-
ment to be unethical. 
34  In general, it will of course be impossible for the enterprise to assess the effects of volun-
tary tax payment, since the resulting, particular public goods and services will not in gen-
eral be identifiable. It has to be assessed on the basis of the general efficiency and utility 
of public services as perceived by the enterprise.  
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vices to citizens of that country.35 Alternatively it may finance some 
of the activities of specialized non-profit, do-good organizations (the 
NGOs) that operate in the P-country. 
 
Here and in the following we have considered the country distribution 
of the company’s activities as given, but it is obvious that in order to 
be taxed in a country, it must have some activities located there. This 
means that the strongest form of tax avoidance of a badly governed 
country is not to establish any plants or any other activities in it at all, 
and in the extreme case not even export anything to the country in 
question. Even if not paying any taxes at all
36
 the location of a compa-
ny’s activities to a country implies a kind of support to the ruling re-
gime that may raise new ethical problems of an inter-temporary na-
ture: when the company pay taxes today will that increase its period of 
survival and decrease the prospects for better public services in the 
future? This dilemma becomes particularly acute for resource extract-
ing companies since in addition to paying taxes and in other ways 
supporting the ruling regime, by extracting the resources those will 
not be available when or if a better regime will be ruling.37  
 
The ethics of the location decisions of multinational companies may 
not only be looked form a consequentialist point of view –the actual 
consequences for the poor of a company’s actions – various deonto-
logical arguments have also been advanced. For example, one may 
consider it wrong and not a CSR action for a company to locate in a 
country where human rights are severely violated although the com-
pany is uninvolved in the violations itself and its own activities may 
improve the welfare of the poor in the country. Deontological argu-
ments dominate the discussion of general economic sanctions directed 
against such regimes where even export activities of a company are 
considered not CSR, and when the consequences of the country 
avoidance may harm its poor severely. Only with a considerable in-
crease in the likelihood of regime improvement may such actions be 
defensible from a consequentialist point of view. We found a defense 
of this kind of action when exposing some of the Marxist ethical 
                                                 
35  As already noted by Max Weber, private and public sector organizations have many struc-
tural features in common and may within limits be able to supply the same kind of goods 
and services. The choice between engaging its own productive apparatus or not will be 
strongly influenced by the industry in which the company operates. For example, a tobac-
co company can hardly use its own apparatus to supply a poor country with inexpensive 
tobacco as part of its CSR activities while a pharmaceutical company may easily do so by 
providing it with medicines far below market price since the marginal costs of medicines 
are normally far below it. NGOs may (and have in fact) nevertheless often be used also in 
the final distribution of the medicines.  
36 The latter only happens in case the country is exposed to international economic sanctions. 
37  In countries with extremely exploitative ruling elites, the foreign investments are empiri-
cally skewed to financial investment or resource extraction that both have strong negative 
inter-temporary effects in case a better regime may appear in a reasonable future. In Nor-
wegian public debate so far the focus has been on petroleum extraction by Statoil, but fi-
nancial investment will receive more attention as the Government Pension Fund Norway 
is increasing in size and geographical spread of its investment.  
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thinking, but collective sanctions that embraces exports to harmful 
regimes are normally not defended ethically this way, but rather by 
deontological arguments, or not at all, only to express moral concern.  
 
Returning to the more limited question of tax avoidance, consequen-
tialist reasoning will not yield a definite answer to the allocation of tax 
payment of multinational companies across poor and rich countries. 
Since on average the countries with most poverty also have the least 
effective and most corrupt public apparatuses, judgments of regime 
quality do not give any clear instructions towards where tax avoidance 
should be most strongly avoided, but they do suggest that the country 
distribution of the CSR portfolio should be directed towards poorer 
countries with a larger share of either own-or NGO supplied public 
services.  
 
The advantage of the NGOs is that they may cover a much larger set 
of public services than the enterprise may deliver itself, but they may 
give less ownership to the outcomes, and more importantly, the infor-
mation about their efficiency is difficult to gather and may remain im-
perfect. An advantage of both compared to tax payment, however, is 
that the enterprise’s contribution to public goods becomes visible and 
public knowledge.38 Arguments of this kind may be difficult to ground 
on any normative platform, however, but are important for any posi-
tive explanation of the size and composition of CSR portfolios. I will 
only touch positive explanations briefly since the paper deals mainly 
with the normative aspects involved in CSR.  
 
As already mentioned, the action-relevant normative beliefs of enter-
prises may be partly revealed through attitudes regarding tax payment 
where profits have to be sacrificed. Here it is a matter for reflection 
that there are few indications that tax payment figure high on the mul-
tinational companies’ list of actual CSR activities while considerable 
efforts appear to be made to avoid tax payment.39 
10. Monopolies, cartels, profit maximization and CSR 
We have already, almost by stealth, left the Walras-world of free 
competition (FC) when we began to study imperfect information, tax 
assessments and CSR. Profit maximization, with imperfect income 
monitoring, we suggested, might easily lead an enterprise to violate 
conditions for CSR behavior (according to definition B)) through tax 
avoidance, particularly in the case of a state with weak, but well-
                                                 
38  The relevant NGOS that may have a ‘stakeholder’ interest in the company may actively 
seek transfers through positive or negative (blackmail) inducements by making public the 
negative or positive public effects of the company’s business activities. 
39  Here we should note that direct evidence of enterprises paying voluntarily more tax than 
what they could with visible tax avoidance efforts is difficult to establish. 
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meaning public authorities. Or it may lead to the violating of the rights 
of minority owners, but at the other hand this very increase in the po-
tential area for business misconduct will also increase the scope for 
B)-defined CSR. The increase in the scope of voluntary tax payment 
or other forms of business misconduct will also increase the scope for 
CSR according to definition C including the ii) –clause: paying more 
taxes than necessary entails some sacrifice.  
 
Various forms of imperfect information is not the only ways that the 
situation may change from an idealized FC so that profit maximization 
may not guide enterprise activities to maximal economic efficiency 
without any serious ethical side effects, even when we stick to conse-
quentialist valuation. For example, a more classical, older issue in 
economics is that with non-convex technologies the enterprises in-
volved may be led into monopolistic forms of competition. To maxim-
izes profit (by manipulating the output prices) the enterprises will then 
produce too little and charge too high prices so the enterprises’ pro-
duction capacities will be underused and the society will receive too 
little of their goods (or services)– a social loss. Its pricing decisions 
will be unethical in consequentialist terms. Compared to an FC situa-
tion, profits are likely to increase, so if the company leadership so de-
cides, it may set aside more income to be spent on its CSR portfolio to 
mitigate the social loss at the same time as its profit maximization 
may not be considered a to reflect CSR any longer. 
 
When judging profitmaking motive in this situation from a normative, 
consequentialist point of view the efficiency loss caused by the output 
shrinking should be compared by the welfare consequences of an 
eventual increase in CSR expenditures. Other ethical views may be 
less sensitive to this change in the situation. From Friedman’s point of 
view, for example, the shift in the situation of an enterprise from FC 
to monopoly makes no difference as long as it is legal: the (deontolog-
ical) duty to maximize profit for the owners of the enterprise remains.  
11. Profit-making or altruism: briefly on the CSR observables 
It is possible that in the final analysis the CSR- related costs and ex-
penditures may increase profits and be motivated by informed profit 
maximization.40 In the short run, however, they represent avoidable 
expense that will reduce appropriable profits for the owners, investors 
and top management. According to one reasonable motive-based defi-
nition of CSR, business leadership should rather sacrifice some of the 
corporation’s income for some ethical purpose to make expenditures 
on charity genuine (Reinhardt and Stavins, 2010). A well-run compa-
ny has a duty to spend some income or set aside some organizational 
                                                 
40  Note that there is no way that they could increase profit under FC conditions. 
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capacity normally used for profit-making to improve the living condi-
tions or capabilities of its employees and other ‘stakeholders’ involved 
over and above what its regular activities will do. Otherwise charity 
may simply be regarded as regular advertisement expenses without 
any ethical content – or with a negative one since the enterprise will 
lie about its motives. Simple compliance with legal regulations will 
not suffice either in this case. Costly over-compliance will be neces-
sary for the enterprise to sacrifice profit in “the social interest” (ibid.) 
of which environmental regulations have received most attention in 
the CSR field. Without sacrifice no CSR. 
 
If this kind of behavior dominates, some altruistic form of motivation 
on the part of the leadership must have been at work. Hence it is rea-
sonable to explore whether some form of altruistic motivation may 
kick in when we seek to explain any short-run sacrifice of profits for a 
seemingly altruistic end. The easiest way to explain altruistic behavior 
is, of course, if the enterprise leadership in fact possess action-relevant 
ones. Here we may note that other forms of motivation than profit or 
utility maximization have been studied in economics that may prove 
useful in the context.41 Given the difficulty of observing motivation, 
experimental methods have been frequently used to study it. A num-
ber of experiments with different sharing experiments (dictator, ulti-
matum and public goods games) have shown that participants have 
chosen other division of outcomes than those that may be explained 
from selfish motives. Altruism appears to be a real motivational force 
in several experimental situations. Of particular relevance for explain-
ing the composition of a CSR portfolio is the economic experiments 
where one has varied the degree of anonymity of the givers. They 
have shown that the willingness to pay for charity is rare under ano-
nymity (Benabou and Tirole, 2010), so pure altruism in this sense ap-
pears to be quite unusual even in experimental situations where not 
much is on stake. A number of real life situations studied confirm this 
impression (donations, election participation and other situations 
where people sacrifice something for the common weal) and indicate 
strongly that people give much more when other people know about 
the giving.42  
 
It these results may be valid to transfer to corporate leadership, they 
may also be relevant for their potential altruistic behavior. For exam-
ple, if leaderships tend to genuinely sacrifice profits in order to make 
social investments, we may expect them to give more, if the gifts are 
                                                 
41  Benabou and Tirole (2010) present and analyze research on pro-social behavior relevant 
for CSR 
42  Donations to some US universities have been studied. For example, less than one percent 
of donations that Harvard Law School received in 1991 were anonymous while less than 
0.2 percent received by Yale Law School was so. Looking at various other institutions 
(Glazer and Konrad, 2006) discovered that it was rare to find more than 1% of donors giv-
ing donations anonymously. 
26 Jens Chr. Andvig 
highly visible. Hence company gifts in terms of taxes paid that could 
legally be avoided should be expected to be rare for that reason 
alone.43 It is also difficult to believe that many company leaders hold 
the activities of the public sector in so high regard that they may do-
nate gifts to the state (even the most efficient and people friendly gov-
ernment) from the purest form of altruistic motivation. When a multi-
national enterprise pays more taxes than it can get away with when 
exploiting the possibilities opened up by the present international 
rules, it is likely to be more from a concern for its reputation as social-
ly responsible corporation among the public officials that may influ-
ence it than by any purely altruistic motive as reflected in anonymous 
gift-giving.. 
 
Regarding the choice between CSR investment using own resources 
or resources giving to specialized NGOs, the latter have apparatuses to 
spread the knowledge of the gift wider and the gift-giving itself may 
be spread on several organizations covering different aims, which then 
may better cover the enterprise social preferences than when constined 
to use the enterprise’s own apparatus.. Some increasing returns may 
also apply to an NGO that may be realized when funds from a number 
of givers are collected. On the other hand, as already noted, home-
made social investment by the enterprise is more clearly identifiable 
and may have more immediate effects on present employee motiva-
tion as well as on the recruiting new employees with more altruistic 
propensities that may prove an economic advantage (Brekke and Ny-
borg, 2008) – hence maybe not become any economic sacrifice after 
all. 
 
The backside of publicity is that if social investment is highly an-
nounced and proves to improve the economic standing of the compa-
nies, its moral value may become heavily discounted (Bénabou and 
Tirole, 2010). 
 
As far as I know no empirical estimates of CSR-motivated tax pay-
ments exist. On the contrary, there are indications that the willingness 
of private enterprises to pay taxes has either declined or their ability to 
avoid it have been increasing due to institutional changes during the 
last decades. From this we may not immediately conclude that the 
share of CSR motivated taxes have fallen, however, since the potential 
for tax avoidance may have increased at a faster rate due to the larger 
scope for shuffling profits across jurisdictions that have followed in 
the wake of financial liberalization and localize them in countries 
which have extremely low rates of taxation. As already noted, unlike 
the other items on the CSR portfolios there exist no estimates of the 
                                                 
43  n Norway individuals’ tax payment has been public knowledge and easily available in-
formation. Rich individuals who pay nothing in taxes are likely to receive bad publicity. 
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size of taxes paid by the companies that are above the minimum legal-
ly possible and paid mainly for altruistic or reputational concerns.
 44
 
Regarding the other two CSR components there are available a large 
number of empirical studies of the aggregate of the other two expendi-
ture classes. While perhaps observable in principle the increase in 
these (classified) CSR expenditures has been suspiciously fast, while 
the tax rates have declined. As reported in Benabou and Tirole (2010) 
the value of assets in the US classified as social investments grew at 
annual rates of about 12% in the 1995 -2005 period and at 18% in 
2005 -2007. By the end of 2007 these social responsible investment 
(SRI) assets constituted 11% of total assets.  
 
A number of empirical investigations study the association between 
CSR expenditures, when operationalized, and financial results. A 
weak positive association has been the most common result (Margolis 
et al, 2007). This certainly suggests that managers are not ‘stealing’ 
profits to do charity as Friedman feared, but may then not reflect 
much CSR in the sense of Reinhard and Stavins (2010) either. After 
finding that the corporate financial and social rates of return are al-
most unrelated in the aggregate Baron et al (2009) suggest that this 
may be explained by that different types of leadership and enterprises 
may cause the weak association: Some enterprises with low financial 
rates of return may yield high social returns, but some with high fi-
nancial returns may also do so.. Given the reliance of the CSR indica-
tors on classification procedures informed by enterprise policy con-
cerns (cf. the rapid increase in SRI classified assets referred to above) 
the empirical standing of these econometric exercises will remain in 
doubt whatever their statistical properties. Nevertheless, the lack of 
convincing results suggests that whether to spend resources on CSR 
activities or not may not be decided on the basis of their effects on 
profits –other normative concerns need to be brought into considera-
tion 
 
                                                 
44  Eventual information about the size of this form of CSR investment is likely to be located 
in the four major international accounting firms and international banks with tax advice 
departments.. Global average tax rate on profits declined with 7.4% from 2006 to 2010/11 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012: 15). While profits have increased its share of GDP in the 
US which presumably should increase the social responsibility to be shouldered by pri-
vate companies, the share of taxes they pay from profit is unchanged since the tax rate on 
profits paid had fallen from 19% to 13% in late 2012 (Bloomberg, January 22, 2013). 
Both movements are connected to globalization and the increased ease by which profit 
may be relocated across jurisdictions. While strongly influenced by cyclical developments 
that have caused a strong recent decline, the downwards trend in tax payment in the US is 
indisputable. Compared to the 1950s the decade rate of corporate tax payment in the 
2000s as share of GDP was halved (from about 4% to about 2%). Research indicates that 
tax avoidance is more developed in the larger companies (Dyreng et al, 2005), the group 
of enterprises we by implication focus on. They are more frequently multinational and 
CSR is more a subject of discussion among them. It is possible that this development to-
wards more tax avoidance may be reversed due to political aftereffects of the 2008 finan-
cial crises and European post 2010 austerity policies, but whether this potential shift in 
policy will be realized or not is too early to tell.at the moment. 
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Bad conscience may be one of them. Several authors have noted that 
companies that supply products or services that have some form of 
harmful properties or effects, spend more on CSR than others – that 
corporate irresponsibility generates social responsibility (Kotchen and 
Moon, 2011).45 While suggestive, their results as the rest of the empir-
ical investigations into CSR portfolios, I find rather inconclusive. The 
indexes used for the purpose contain too many subjective choices to 
carry any refined empirical analyses.46  
12. Company information handling, CSR and business ethics 
The distribution of information and its handling is part of any reason-
able CSR strategy. Increased possibilities for manipulating infor-
mation will increase the corporate strategy set and the scope for re-
sponsible actions as well as the scope for the irresponsible ones. These 
possibilities vary strongly with the kind of product or service the 
company supplies; how easy it is to lie about its quality to the custom-
ers;47 and how the public regulation of their supply to the market is 
                                                 
45  According to Meng ((2007) the global pharmaceutical companies on average contribute 
five times more to CSR programs than the national US average. This must be regarded 
against their high profit margins. In 2004 the large pharmaceutical companies maintained 
a profit rate three times the median for the larger US companies (ibid: 20). The large share 
of product donations compared to cash gifts from the global pharmaceutical leaders is an-
other important property. For example, in 2005 Pfizer contributed 6% of its total corpo-
rate giving in cash and 94 % in kind (together 8.8% of profits) while the British Glax-
oSmithKline (GSK another global leader) spent about 15% in cash and the rest in differ-
ent forms of in-kind expenditures - altogether 5.6% of profits. The major social irrespon-
sibility form of conduct that the multinational pharmaceutical companies perform is a 
monopolistic pricing policy that contributes to the non-survival of poor citizens in poor 
countries. Her case study is supported by a multi-branch econometric analyses of CSR 
(Kotchen and Moon, 2011), although they use a wider definition of CSR embracing more 
than charity expenditures. They show that the pharmaceutical industry follows a more 
general pattern in that companies that ‘do more harm also do more good,’ using the KLD 
social rating data base for operationalizing the ‘goods’ and the ‘bads’. Although only 
looking at the interactions within a US contexts ‘chemicals and pharmaceuticals’ (togeth-
er with ‘hospital management, and ‘bank and financial services’) are the industries where 
the ‘bads’ had the strongest impact on the CSR activities. It may be too rash to conclude 
from this that CSR activities in the pharmaceutical industry are only superficial letters of 
indulgence used in PR strategies. A number of pharmaceutical charity activities also re-
flect the genuine organizational difficulties when combining a private profit-based pro-
duction of life-saving goods with the existing global distribution of income and public 
sector capabilities. 
46  An informative overview of the reliability problems of some of the most widely used of 
these highly subjective non-financial, ‘social’ performance metrics is Chatterji and Levine 
(2006). They followed it up by a statistical analysis of their –inter-correlation and predic-
tive powers (Chatterji and Levine, 2008). The validity of the measures was explored by 
choosing the ones dealing with environment where they could be compared with some ob-
jective statistics (Chatterji et al, 2009). They found a reasonable correspondence histori-
cally, but that the subjective ratings had little predictive power, an important quality for 
their use as guiding socially conscientious investors.  
47  A common way to classify goods according to how easy it is to trick the customers about 
their quality is to distinguish between ‘search goods’, ‘experience goods’ and ‘credence 
goods’ (Katz, 2007: 13). In the case of search goods the consumer may determine the 
quality of the good before the purchase while in the case of experience goods the quality 
may only be determined afterwards when the consumer have used the good or experi-
enced the effects of the service during a period. In the case of credence goods, however, 
the quality may not be ascertained at all without specialist investigations. Many ordinary 
goods – like precooked lasagna– have credence attributes: You may not determine from 
eating it that this particular lasagna contains horsemeat or beef or even harmful ingredi-
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implemented. Again, the larger the scope for misrepresentation, the 
larger is the scope for ethical conduct. With a high rate of discovery it 
does not pay to make fraudulent products. When easy, it does and 
many may do so.48  
 
Any observed increase in the prevalence of fraudsters give the (cor-
rect) impression that CSR defined as absence of misconduct (defini-
tion B)) decreases with the ease of fraud (particularly in so-called cre-
dence markets with poor customers and weak public regulation).49 
According to definition C) (including the ii) –sacrifice-condition), 
however, the CSR activities may increase, since it may become more 
demanding to sacrifice profit by abstaining from fraud, but the size of 
this sacrifice and its incidence will not in general be observable. It is 
clearly possible and potentially profitable for multinational companies 
to exploit the consumers and authorities ability to control the quality 
of products across countries. Crime victimization studies indicate that 
poor countries are likely to be most frequently harmed. To do so will 
violate CSR demands according to the B)-definition, but not doing it 
when the possibilities increase may move more companies’ actions 
from the adiaphorous to pro-ethics areas, particularly when they ab-
stain from it in poor countries.  
 
Pure information acts and their manipulation are often done jointly 
with other forms of action and may impact the normative evaluation 
of the joint act. We have seen how this has been the case for tax pay-
ment. But the supply of information is an act itself over which agents 
make ethical judgments.50 A reasonable part of any CSR strategy is its 
information policy, whether it seeks to emit only truthful information 
about its activities and results or not, and how much information it 
seeks to prevent reaching the public. Transparency has become a 
                                                 
ents. An important arena for credence goods are medical goods and services. Here quack-
ery is known from time immemorial.  
48  While the data from crime victimization surveys contain unexplained variation, it is nev-
ertheless a clear trend that consumer fraud is more prevalent in poor countries (van Dijk, 
2008: 344- 347). 
49  A common way to classify goods according to their informational attributes is to distin-
guish between ‘search goods’, ‘experience goods’ and ‘credence goods’ (Katz, 2007: 13). 
In the case of search goods the consumer may determine the quality of the good before the 
purchase while in the case of experience goods the quality may only be determined after-
wards when the consumer have used the good or experienced the effects of the service 
during a period. In the case of credence goods the quality may not be ascertained at all 
without specialist investigations. Many ordinary goods - like almost any food – have cre-
dence attributes. You may not determine from eating it that this particular can of tuna fish 
contains harmful metals. This property of much food and its relevance for CSR was made 
clear for the European public after the ‘horsemeat scandal’ of January 2013 (The Guardi-
an ,May 10, 2013) was made clear that horsemeat was fraudulently used instead of beef in 
a number of food items. In the case of medical goods and services the credence attributes 
are likely to dominate and give rise to a number of CSR issues.  
50  In fact, most multinational companies have established separate information departments - 
often closely connected to offices dealing with CSR and ethical aspects – that handle and 
control information emitted from the companies. Like the case of CSR the information ac-
tivities may be outsourced to specialized institutions, in this case commercial PR organi-
zations, consultancies or think tanks with more public aims on their agendas. Except pos-
sibly for the latter, charity motives are not likely to be involved. 
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catchword in debates about public as well as private governance, but a 
similar mechanism to the one pointed out for general CSR by Kotchen 
and Moon (2011) may have been at work here: more calls for trans-
parency may in fact go together with stricter control of information 
and selective secrecy.  
 
Since information characteristics such as lying/truthfulness are by 
themselves only resource demanding in a trivial sense from an eco-
nomic point of view; the C) definition of CSR that we have used in 
most of our discussion of tax payment does not apply. It is either A) – 
CSR as ethical conduct, or B) –  CSR as absence of business miscon-
duct – that apply.  Note that what we are discussing here is not lying 
by individuals who happen to be employed by a company, but lying 
performed by or incentivized51 by the company leadership, mostly in 
order to further the interest of the enterprise. It is then not obvious 
whether and how a lie represents an unethical act or a case of business 
misconduct in any given case since several plausible, partly contradic-
tory ethical principles may apply even in this extreme case of infor-
mation handling  
 
A reasonable definition of is the following: lying is ‘an information 
act where the sender of information intentionally seeks to deceive the 
receivers either about the state of the world or about the sender’s be-
lief’s about the state of the world,’ (cf. Mahon (2008)).52 Note that the 
definition includes both an action and a motivation component. 
 
In his classic discussion Kant argued that lying was an unethical act 
whatever the ultimate motivation, situation or consequence of the act. 
Since lying about either motives or the state of the world is a compo-
nent in more complex string of actions where most parts don’t rely on 
it, a Kantian assumption implies that a large number of corporate ac-
tivities become unethical, also activities that normally are classified as 
CSR either because of the kind of expenditure involved or because of 
its consequences: If a pharmaceutical company expends 100 million 
                                                 
51  The incentives in applied in the financial industry have received considerable attention 
and have had a significant global economic impact through their stimulation of sales ef-
forts of fraudulent financial packages. 
52  The prevalence of lying is an aspect of human behavior that creates difficulties in man-
agement of people inside companies, in the public authorities steering of corporations and 
public behavior, and in the political organization of citizens. It also, of course, creates se-
vere problems for social scientists when they try to map and explain behavior, attitudes 
and views of the world. Together with killing and stealing it is also a kind of behavior that 
is almost universally condemned in most religions and other value systems guiding eve-
ryday behavior. The classic treatment of lying that discusses it both from a philosophical 
and commonsense social science point of view remains S. Bok (1978). Although a classi-
cal problem in philosophy, it has only recently received systematic interest from econo-
mists despite its obvious importance for much economic behavior. One reason for the ne-
glect is that the classification of the phenomenon relies on the difficult to observe motiva-
tion of the liar. The introduction and acceptance of experimental psychology methods in 
economics has changed that situation. A recent study of lie aversion when the lie has 
slightly positive effects for both the liar and the deceived is Cappelen et al (2012).  
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dollars on support to (expected) unprofitable research on leprosy or 
supplying gratis medicine, but does it not out of kindness, but in order 
to ensure political protection of its monopoly earnings and thus lies 
about its motive, it becomes unethical according to this ethical view 
about lying. Hence, expenditures classified as CSR according to the 
C) definition will not be so according to this ethical specification of 
definition A).  
 
The hypothetical case of a multinational company that seeks to max-
imize the expected welfare of its tax payments across country regimes 
by moving taxes away from the harmful towards the helpful ones to-
wards the poor, but in order to do so has to wrongly state where the 
profits actually has arisen (lying about the state of the world to one or 
several tax authorities) its tax evasion becomes unethical whatever the 
consequences and its motive. -Let us expand the case of lying and look 
more generally at the definition A) – CSR as ethical business conduct 
– when we allow several ethical systems to be potentially valid and 
illustrate this with the following schematic figure:53  
 
Diagram 1. Components in ethical judgments: a simplified scheme  
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53  Note that we here and when presenting Definition A) have defined ‘ethical behavior’ 
inclusively as behavior that is allowed according one or more ethical system. In many eve-
ryday deliberations one may define ‘ethical’ exclusively as behavior that satisfies all the 
different, recognized norm systems as long as the rule systems don’t contradict each other 
with respect to a given act. To prevent such possibilities we may use diagram 1 to define 
ethics exclusively as a set of screens where only ‘good’ motives that guide ‘good actions’ 
in a set of allowable situations leading to ‘good’ consequences may be considered as ethi-
cal acts.   
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So far we have discussed two simplified ethical approaches to CSR: 1) 
consequentialist where the normative focus is on the consequences 
and where the rest of the components are either ethically neutral or 
derived from their consequences (cf. profit maximization under free 
competition vs. monopoly) and 2) deontological ones where the focus 
are either on i) actions like the Kantian case of lying and in much of 
human rights thinking54 or ii) motives (as in some Kant interpreta-
tions). Since the discussion of ethics is confined to ethics as it may 
apply to leaders of multinational companies, this is part of any situa-
tion, but there may be other components of a situation that may be of 
interest. Generally what is right may change with the situation so CSR 
defined as ethical leadership actions may be local, and defined over 
bundles of motivation, action, situation and consequence components. 
Change in one, for example, a situation component, may change the 
normative valuation of the whole bundle.55  
 
Look for example at the case where a company leadership pays a bribe 
that gains both the company and the official that receives it without (a 
rather special, but possible condition) anyone else being hurt. The mo-
tive behind the action – profit maximization – and the action itself – 
the buying and selling of services – are often considered ethically neu-
tral and when the consequences are good in this case, the whole trans-
action should look adiaphorous from a deontological and recommend-
able from consequentialist point of view. Nevertheless, this situation 
where an enterprise transforms a public administrative transaction to a 
market one, will many perceive as unethical in itself.  
 
There are many other and maybe more clear-cut cases56 where the ac-
tivity also may be wholly legal but where situational components such 
as the market organization of an action may violate situation-based 
ethical norms.57 This may be of particular relevance for multinational 
companies that operate in constituencies where citizens may hold op-
posing local norms or where large differences in poverty levels may 
become the basis for profit. As a case of the latter we may consider a 
private hospital located in a poor neighborhood in a developing coun-
try that buys kidneys from the locals and sell kidney operations for  
                                                 
54  A much discussed issue is the relationship between multinational companies’ localization 
decisions and eventual local violation of human rights. In most cases it is not a question of 
whether the company itself violates a human right by its own actions (except through its 
location decision), but whether the authorities of the location do so. If they do, does this 
create a negative ethical spillover to the company directly derived from the authorities’ 
unethical acts, or only if the location of the company has as one of its consequences that 
the violator regime strengthen its position and may continue its violation of human rights? 
55  Developed systematically, this line of thinking may get into conflict with several ethical 
systems that aim for generality. An important study that insists on the ethical importance 
of particular situations is Walzer (1983 ),where a number of different situations where dif-
ferent norms are likely to be invoked, is analyzed.  
56  After all, bribes are illegal, may imply some lying, and this may easily move such actions 
to the non-permissible fields from deontological perspectives.  
57  Sandel (2011) suggests a number of situations where such local norms about proper 
methods of transacting are violated when organized as markets. 
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profit to well-off people from the rich countries. Here it is the wide 
gap in economic circumstances in the different sides of the kidney 
market in addition to the market itself that may make the hospitals’ 
profit- making ethically revolting, although it may improve the lives 
of everyone involved when all operations are properly done and both 
motivations and actions themselves are either ethically neutral or rec-
ommendable from deontological perspectives.58 The point here is that 
whatever the company leadership is doing so may this field of activity 
as a profit-making arena appear incompatible with CSR. 
13. Informational requirements of the different ethical evalu-
ation systems  
We have seen that informational actions will often be part of the CSR 
considerations and may be evaluated in similar ways as resource-
demanding actions such as tax payment. When judging the various 
ethical norm systems and studying what kind of requirements they set 
on for company behavior including its informational acts, it is an in-
teresting attribute of the different systems for judging the ethical value 
of company leadership behavior themselves have informational com-
ponents. As soon as one put one’s mind to it, it is rather obvious that 
the information required for making ethical judgments on the basis of 
motives, actions and consequences differ substantially.  
 
In most cases it is almost impossible to get to know the motives of the 
different agents involved, although they may to some degree be in-
ferred from behavior. Only the leadership of corporation itself will 
know their motives for any behavior: Is the motive for supporting a 
local school genuine concern for the education in the neighborhood or 
part of a political bribe?  
 
Actions on the other hand are more easily observable together with 
their immediate consequences. Ethical systems based on judgments 
directly related to actions relevant for business leaderships are often 
closely related to rights-based systems.59 Since the norms on which 
actions are judged may differ, knowledge of these – such as trade un-
ion or prayer rights- are important for enterprises operating in differ-
ent political constituencies, but otherwise no deep knowledge of the 
society in question is needed in order to develop CSR strategies that 
may avoid condemnable actions of its own and comply with rights 
                                                 
58  Particularly the asymmetry of information between the donator and the hospital, but also 
between the receiver and the hospital may give rise to a number of abuses in practice that 
are obviously unethical from all conceivable ethical points of view. To organize the allo-
cation of transferable kidneys as a market represent a high ethical risk way of doing it, so 
when abuses occur the organizers of it, such as private hospital may, may be considered 
as corporate irresponsible behavior.  
59 For example, in the Kantian argumentation against lying, the right of its victims to know 
the true state of nature is violated.   
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based ethics.  For a multinational company the question of rights arise 
most acutely at the time of entry or potential exit where it is not only a 
question of the company’s own actions, but whether the violation of 
rights by the authorities in the constituency are so extensive that it will 
be ethically wrong (or excessively harmful to its reputation) to enter 
or stay. Location decisions are an extremely important part of any 
company’s CSR strategy where the different informational require-
ments of the different ethical systems play a significant role. 
 
To base ethical judgments on norms over consequences is on the other 
hand very information-demanding. Here it is not only a question of 
spelling out a set of norms and see whether a set of actions violate 
them in a direct way, but the set of the company’s own actions have to 
be tied to a set of expected consequences and a metric for how their 
value should be aggregated, developed. This would ideally demand a 
thorough knowledge of the society in which the corporation operates. 
Without that knowledge it would impossible to assess the conse-
quences of one’s actions, i.e. how far one’s responsibilities stretch. 
Again, this will normally be even more difficult when the corporate 
leadership belongs to a different constituency than the one in which a 
plant operates.  
 
In principle, the consequences of any large enterprise activity may 
stretch far out. For example, in countries with widespread poverty 
where an enterprise with large earnings of quasi-rents is located, its 
choice of spending may potentially affect a large number of citizens: 
will it spend it locally or send it abroad? To aggregate the diversity of 
moral claims that arise from a study of the potential consequences of 
company actions may create unreasonably large moral claims against 
a company, leading corporate leaderships (like well-off citizens in 
general60) to disregard all ethical responsibilities of this kind altogeth-
er. The set of consequences and the corresponding normative value 
assignments have to be limited in order to be manageable both from 
informational and ethical points of view.  
 
In practical terms, a consequence-based ethical CSR strategy is then 
sometimes limited and based on a predetermined set of agents whose 
welfare is to be considered, a set of ‘stakeholders’ which is a term fre-
quently appearing in the CSR literature. In line with a consequence 
oriented, utilitarian-like approach, the stakeholders are treated sym-
metrically. Usually the set of stakeholders are limited to the set of 
agents with whom the enterprise directly interacts; regulatory authori-
ties, customers, workers, lenders and so on, but sometimes that will 
                                                 
60  A philosophical analysis of the dilemmas that arise through such aggregation of moral 
claims in the case of citizens is Fishkin (1982). Since leaderships of large multinational 
companies dispose of more resources than any regular citizens, these dilemmas are at least 
as relevant for them . 
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also be too narrow. For example, in the case of a pharmaceutical en-
terprise that possesses an international monopoly of a life-giving med-
icine, the most important group of stakeholders are all the ill and poor 
people in the world who cannot afford to buy it. While demanding 
from an informational point of view, consequentialism appears more 
complementary to the regular activities of a profit-making enterprise 
which need to assess the prospects for profits before entering a new 
constituency anyway. To do so it has to assess the economic conse-
quences of its entry.  
 
Another way to solve the conundrum of how far to go in the collecting 
of information –one has to know what one still cannot possibly know 
in order to make the decision right – is simply to decide not to know 
any more. This decision may be motivated by a desire to avoid unnec-
essary complexity or to avoid knowing suspected unethical conse-
quences of its actions- a quite common motivation in enterprise 
knowledge collection.61 
 
One practical way to handle that suspicion is by blocking the access of 
knowledge about negatively valued ethical consequences of an action 
through decentralizing the information collection internally so the 
leadership will not know. For example, in the context of corruption, 
the corporate leadership may introduce strong economic incentives to 
the country heads for the corporation’s activities in even highly cor-
rupt countries. Country heads receive or lose large rewards when they 
succeed/ not succeed in gaining large contracts. The multinational 
company leadership may do so even though it knows that this incen-
tive structure may go together with higher corruption risks. If they, as 
most leaderships claim, sincerely believe that corruption is socially 
harmful, they will now not know whether the profit-making choices 
induced by the harder incentive structure they have made, results in 
more corruption or not. That knowledge stops at the country head. The 
country head may then again effectively outsource that knowledge as 
well as the actual bribe actions to local consultants who know the ac-
tual constituency better.62 Outsourcing of high corruption risk activi-
ties is of course another general way of not knowing.  
                                                 
61  In a set of interesting experiments (Dana, Kuang and Weber, 2007) the participant are first 
presented with a simple dictator-like game where most participants are willing to sacrifice 
something small in order that the others are not strongly harmed. In a second more uncer-
tain situation the ‘choosers’ may again choose an alternative where they receive either the 
best outcome or an outcome where they sacrifice something small. But now they are in a 
lottery where the best outcome may not always lead to the bad outcome for the others. 
They don’t know for certain whether their action will prove harmful. To make the right 
choice for the other, they must ascertain which situation is on, which they can do without 
significant costs, but they don’t do so and feel now free to choose the most selfish solu-
tion consistently. The other might not loose. That is enough.  
62  There have been introduced clauses in anti-corruption laws of a number of countries that 
make it illegal for multinational companies to bribe abroad even through middlemen such 
as consultants or local partners, but such bribing is even more difficult to prove. In prac-
tice most companies that engage in such bribing follows the recipe once described in 
Marsh (1989) business manual for how to trade abroad; that is, do most bribing through 
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14. Lobbying, company cooperation and CSR – a note. 
So far we have looked at an extremely simple situation where a single, 
typical (possibly multinational) company is studied. We have asked 
how its various ethically relevant choices may be judged under alter-
native, but very simplified ethical norm systems. Since both the poten-
tially ethically relevant effects as well as the ethical norm system itself 
may change with the number or fraction of companies that are making 
the same choice, a study of a typical company may become too poor 
in a number of social contexts. In this section we will not try to open 
up the multi-agent case for systematic investigation, however. The 
number of possibilities expands too fast, so we will just point at a few, 
just to make aware the limitation in the typical enterprise approach we 
have followed.  
 
One set of ethically relevant distinction of a multi-agent adoption of a 
given piece of enterprise action, is whether the adoption is reached 
through enterprise cooperation or not. In some ethical systems volun-
tary cooperation among enterprises may have an ethical value of its 
own while forced ‘cooperation’ dictated by the state may have a nega-
tive value. In a number of situations a proper CSR strategy implies a 
necessity for corporations to cooperate. Much of the strength of the 
CSR as an ideological movement has been the belief that companies 
through their own voluntary cooperation may avoid a number of regu-
lations fixed by the state and introduce their own more flexible ones. 
An example may be introduction of voluntary quality standards (in-
cluding one on CSR) instead of state-dictated obligatory standards 
where the degree of compliance may vary. The belief has been partly 
inspired by the idea that through mutual bargaining firms (and groups 
of consumers) may on a voluntary basis agree on the division of costs 
(in case of negative spillovers from one enterprise to another) or shar-
ing of gains (in case of positive spillovers) that may gain both. More-
over, the actual outcomes may shadow any public solution.63 By de-
veloping this possibility, adding some altruism or enlightened self-
interest, one of the partners may even sacrifice some profits for estab-
lishing the common good whether that consists in abeyance to com-
mon technical requirements, pollution standards or the sharing of lob-
bying costs.  
 
                                                 
consultancies, but control each by one company employee, and one only. In addition to 
reducing the risk of being made responsible, by shielding the leadership from bribe in-
formation, it not only reduces some of the legal risks, but also some of the moral costs in-
volved and much in the manner illustrated in the experiment described in Dana et al. 
(2007). If internalized, the only certain costs of an unethical act are its moral costs. Those 
may be at least be partly avoided by not knowing.   
63 The classical exposition in economics here is Coase (1960). It has clearly inspired the later 
CSR movement by presenting a number of situations where several desirable outcome of 
public regulation conceivably may be achieved through voluntary bargaining, including 
economic transfers, between enterprises.  
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When the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India (2011) 
was spelling out the different dimensions of CSR it considers relevant, 
the ministry (unlike much of the prevailing CSR literature) empha-
sized the importance of the lobbying behavior of larger enterprises. 
Whether a company joins a company group effort that may cause a 
public harm or a public good is obviously very important for the final 
normative evaluation of the sacrifice it makes for its group public 
good. In practice, the ethical evaluation of company cooperation such 
as lobbying both when focused on information acts and when seeking 
to influence the allocation of real resources will to a large degree 
hinge upon whether it may create a public good or a public harm. For 
the area we have focused much of our attention on, taxes, the public 
characteristic of company lobbying for reduced taxes tend s to be 
closer to a public harm than a public good. 
 
In many cases the ethical assessment of any enterprise choice act may 
change with the fraction of companies that makes the choice, without 
any direct cooperation and where the different ethical assessment 
functions may move in opposite directions. For example, if the envi-
ronmental returns from the adoption of a costly cleaning technology 
are increasing in the number of enterprises that adopt it, the environ-
mental effects of the first firm that install it will be of less consequen-
tial value than the last one, when regarded in isolation. Sacrifices 
made when members are few tend to be higher (may have stronger 
negative impact on their competitive strength) and may be more 
praiseworthy from a deontological inspired point of view, 64 however. 
Lifting the isolation restraint, it is reasonable that the first movers’ ac-
tions may be more ethically valuable also from a consequence orient-
ed point of view, however, if they induce a more widespread introduc-
tion of the cleaning technology 
 
That is, norms relevant for CSR may change and interact with the out-
comes of CSR through the fraction of companies that adhere to a giv-
en action when they cooperate, but also when they interact inde-
pendently. The consequence or situation sensitive (local justice) ethi-
cal systems may in general appear to be more sensitive to the number 
of enterprises that adopt any CSR sensitive type of action of the 
‘good’ type, but also in the case of the ‘bad’ type where consequen-
                                                 
64  We are here deliberately vague at this point. I am not aware of any systematic ethical 
system that argues that some act is less morally reprehensible or praiseworthy the larger 
or smaller the fraction of people who commit it. This is very much a common sense kind 
of notion, but it may be defensible mainly under the roof of some consequentialism if we 
as part of the consequences include the psychological costs of doing something wrong. 
From a deontological point of view as suggested here it may make only sense metaphori-
cally. In everyday life it is clear that ethically judgments are very sensitive to the relative 
incidence of the behavior in question where ethically ‘good’ acts increase in value with its 
rarity, and where ethically ‘bad’ acts become less blameworthy when they become more 
frequent. In a vague sense this common sense view may mix notions from deontological 
and consequentialist system by imputing value to deontological commitments through 
their assessed social and economic consequences for the performer. 
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tialist and commonsense deontological judgments (cf. footnote 64) 
interact.  
 
To take an example of the latter: When a larger fraction of companies 
engage in corrupt behavior, the moral costs for each is likely to de-
cline while. While the moral costs may decline with the fraction en-
gaged in corruption their economic costs may increase for each com-
pany as well as for the whole group of companies and society at large. 
Nevertheless for each company in this situation it pays to bribe, but 
the corporate social responsible act is for each company to refrain 
from bribing and to establish forms of cooperation where they police 
each other and do not commit any corrupt act, but how?   
15. Anti-corruption and prospects of company cooperation.  
 A case  
Corruption is illegal and is supposed to be policed by a public anti-
corruption agency with some police authority. Compliance with the 
public authorities’ regulation and CSR behavior would imply that each 
company refrains from paying bribes and reports on others when they 
discover some misconduct. Alternatively, they could do the policing 
themselves according to the CSR through organized, but voluntary 
cooperation which then becomes part of their CSR strategy. This ap-
pears possible since they share a common interest in not paying any 
bribes at all. Empirically, both possibilities for CSR conduct – the re-
fraining from paying bribes and the reporting of own and competitors’ 
bribe payment seems to occur only rarely in the context, however.65  
 
We will look into some reasons that may explain the difficulty in or-
ganizing mutual policing with or without the cooperation of the rele-
vant public authority even in situations where the companies have 
stronger immediate interests in cooperation than the one just outlined. 
We are looking at information acts only.  
 
The particular case is taken from the oil industry where the multina-
tional companies themselves are procurers of large scale projects and 
where their procurement may be diverted by bribes paid by the sellers 
or their representatives to some disloyal officials of the petroleum 
companies. Corruption now normally means that the companies have 
to pay a higher price, so each company has an economic interest in not 
                                                 
65  The main mechanism that prevents cooperation and conveying information to the public 
agency is the proven unwillingness of the competing companies to whistle-blow on each 
other (Søreide, 2008).  She suggests several reasons why that might be the case: that whis-
tle-blowing by a company may prevent it to join a cartel, that local politicians controlling 
procurement may gain by from corruption. The simplest explanation in case one is in a 
high corruption equilibrium is simple tit-for-tat mechanisms: If you rat on me, I rat on you 
and both may lose contracts.. 
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paying a price that includes a bribe.66 Unlike their own eventual bribe 
payment where they may gain access to potential oil sources, as buy-
ers the oil companies had no own interest in getting involved in a cor-
rupt transaction. Here it is not only in industry interests, but also, and 
mostly so, in each transacting company’s interest to prevent bribe-
payment in its procurement process. Corruption would be harmful for 
each company not only for the money paid out, but also for the danger 
to the efficiency, loyalty of and commitment of the officials in its own 
organization. In addition, the eventual bad reputation caused by the 
eventual public knowledge that one of its officials was a bribe receiv-
er, could hit its stock prices and its general social reputation: if one 
disloyal servant why not several? Why was not the company better in 
monitoring its employees?  
 
The different companies have also important common interests and 
may gain by sharing information. They are often engaged jointly as 
co-procurers for a given extraction field (although headed by one of 
them as its ‘operator’). Many of the same suppliers participate in the 
different procurement processes, so if anyone tries to bribe, it would 
be useful for the other companies to know. They may then consider a 
boycott or some other forms of policing the supplier. Also engaged in 
procurement are a number of so-called information brokers who buy 
and sell illegal (and legal) bid information throughout industry. If one 
company is able to discover an information broker who operate ille-
gally and reveal the identity to the rest of the industry, it would more 
difficult for him to harm the other companies. For getting the full ef-
fect, the identity has also to be revealed to the police. That would also 
be the only socially responsible thing to do.  
 
If any corrupt transaction would be publicly revealed, however, it may 
harm the company e exposed to corruption strongly, and possibly also 
the reputation of the whole industry. If the latter effect was weak, it 
would harm the single company to go public, but would on the whole 
gain the whole industry. In practice, if bringing the case forward to the 
police, the case became public. If all cooperated and went public, it 
would on average gain the whole industry, and the loss to reputation 
of the single ‘whistleblowing’ company would be smaller if all the 
companies tend to go public with their corruption experiences. Hence, 
the following simple (assurance or stag hunt) game might catch the 
situation: 
                                                 
66  This case is based on an attempt made by some major r oil-companies  (EXXON, BP, 
Statoil and a couple of others) in the mid-1990s to protect themselves against corruption 
directed towards their own procurement. They cooperated then by establishing a joint an-
ti-corruption office in London and mainly manned by former police officers who cooper-
ated with the security department in each company, not by its information or ethical spe-
cialists. The bribing processes together with their information requirements are presented 
and analyzed in Andvig (1995), but I did not then analyze or describe the establishment of 
this cooperation itself  
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Diagram 2. Policing procurement . ‘Cooperation’67  
  
If this game describes the situation, a common information pooling 
office that may collect and share the participating enterprises’ corrup-
tion experiences between themselves and with the police could prove 
to be a lasting solution when first established, but to establish it from a 
situation where everyone keep their corruption incidences secret, 
should be difficult. Presumably each company will then continue to 
keep the information internally about their own bribe receivers and 
bribe-payers – a more interesting piece of information for the rest of 
the industry – to themselves. By conveying that information single-
handed each will lose. For a number of reasons, not all known me, the 
cooperation broke down, however.  
 
While the information pool might have broken down for a number of 
external reasons, it may also have been factors intrinsic to the situation 
that might cause a breakdown. While each company had an interest in 
fighting its own corruption, where its success will be increased if the 
other company emitted relevant information, the effects of the loss of 
reputation could be so strong and the gains from cooperation too small 
so that the situation could be stylized more like a prisoner’s dilemma 
game?  
 
                                                 
67  To call this cooperation may be a misnomer. It is a non-cooperative game, but it is a game 
where one of the outcomes may sustain an office that may be perceived as a cooperative 
solution. 
EXXON     
Go  Public
Stay secret
Go Public
BP
{ 2 , 2} { - 1 , 1 }
Stay Secret
{1 , - 1} { 0 , 0}
BP – EXXON  ”go public/ stay secret” Stag hunt game 
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Diagram 3. Policing procurement. Non-cooperation  
EXXON     
Go  Public
Stay Secret
Go Public
BP
{ 2 , 2 } { - 1 ,  3 }
Stay Secret
{ 3 , -1 } { 1 , 1 }
BP-EXXON ”go public/stay secret” PD game
There we see that the advantage of secrecy is so large that it would 
pay to remain secretive even if the other company went public (that is, 
has gone to the police with its case). Here the value of secrecy will be 
added to the value received from the other company’s corruption reve-
lation. Like before, if the other company remains secretive, the best on 
can do is to remain secretive too. 
 
If CSR really had become internalized in the industry and the compa-
nies were willing to and desiring to cooperate in a way that would be 
beneficial to themselves as a group as well as increasing the supply of 
public goods in the sense of making dishonest business practices less 
profitable, one would expect the companies to assist in keeping such 
an office going.68 Rather than trivialize it, the stigma attached to cor-
ruption increased when revealed increasing the gain to secrecy. The 
main organizational consequence in the oil companies appears to be 
that the corruption-relevant CSR strategies tend rather to be adminis-
tered by information/ethics departments closer to company leaderships 
than by company security offices manned by ex-policemen. With this 
arrangement more efforts are made to handle eventual reputational 
fall-outs due to corruption incidences than to catch bribe receivers and 
bribe givers, the focus of the former arrangements. In any case, fewer 
incidents will reach the public eye through voluntary company infor-
mation actions when the ‘fight against corruption’ becomes more pub-
lic and corruption stigma thereby become more pronounced. 
                                                 
68  The office was closed after a few years. 
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If CSR expressed through corruption avoidance really had been inter-
nalized and expressed through joint efforts in reducing actual business 
misconduct (a consequence oriented value), one would expect the 
companies to keep information-sharing offices going. But if corrup-
tion avoidance mainly expresses a non-ethical, profit-motivated repu-
tational concerns, the gain of secrecy would increase and a CSR strat-
egy administered by an information/ethics department specialized in 
reputation management and not by ex-policemen eager to catch crooks 
will tend to make a better fit. 
16. Summary and conclusions 
In this paper I have focused on three different ways to explore corpo-
rate social responsibility (CSR): i) as a set of corporate behaviors that 
may be characterized as ‘ethical’ (definition A). Ethical has mainly 
been interpreted in an inclusive way so we have looked at the implica-
tions of some well-known ethical systems, but simplified close to ba-
nality in order to highlight plausible implications for business conduct. 
To study those I have taken the liberty to allow corporate behavior 
that may appear rather unrealistic. Ethical implications of profit max-
imization have been under particular scrutiny. ii) CSR as absence of 
misconduct (definition B). Here we have mainly studied pure infor-
mation acts such as lying and corruption where information handling 
is a key. Most of the paper, however, has dealt with CSR as iii) ways 
to spend corporate net income for some public purpose (definition C). 
Here the main interest has been on tax payment as part of a CSR port-
folio that otherwise includes resources spent on public goods or ser-
vices supplied through the company’s own organization or outsourced 
to some non-government organization NGO or specialized private or-
ganization. 
 
The focus on tax payment made it possible to study a typical and mul-
tinational company. Tax administration is a regulatory system that 
embraces all enterprises so we did not have to go into the technologi-
cal and institutional details of any particular industry. Naturally, CSR 
issues vary significantly across industries. Moreover, a multinational 
company will to some degree be able to choose which country to pay 
tax to. This implies that it will choose where to assist the state to pro-
duce public services and goods (or bads) across regimes ruling popu-
lations at widely different income levels and with varying degree of 
efficiency and fairness. That is, tax payment choices bring us directly 
into one, if not the most important ethical arena today, the prevalence 
of widespread difference in poverty across countries (Pogge, 2008). If 
the high hopes that the increased power and prestige of multinational 
companies may somehow make a substantial contribution to resolve 
global inequalities, their tax payment is clearly one of the potentially 
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most important instruments. Moreover, if companies pay more taxes 
to poor, well intentional regimes than would follow from maximal tax 
avoidance efforts, it may reveal more purely eventual altruistic moti-
vation than the other components of the CSR expenditure portfolio 
where the expenditures may be mainly motivated by reputation con-
cerns. 
 
Seen from this perspective the extensive use of tax havens and the 
available information about the large resource efforts made by reputa-
ble multinational companies in order to avoid taxes,69 may throw 
doubts on the genuineness of the whole CSR agenda, and not only 
about the ethical motivation behind their tax payment decisions. Here 
we must add a qualification to our hypocrisy implication from tax 
avoidance to the wider CSR agenda: while there is available consider-
able amount of data about tax avoidance efforts, I am not aware of any 
empirical research that has estimated how much more taxes (and 
which) enterprises that may (deliberately) pay above the minimum 
legally possible taxes, so we are not able to definitely conclude that 
the whole CSR agenda is flawed, but it does throw considerable doubt 
about its sincerity.  
 
In most of the paper we have studied the CSR choices seen from the 
perspective of one, typical multinational company. CSR naturally 
deals with social behavior where what the company leaderships are 
likely to do in terms of delivering public goods and services or feel 
about what may be right and wrong, will depend upon what other 
companies are doing and how ‘stakeholders’ – citizens, companies 
and organizations that are effected – respond. Hence, this is a severe 
limitation of the study, but to bring them in will bring on a large num-
ber of new considerations, if brought on systematically. In order just 
to indicate what kind of considerations that then may follow, we 
looked briefly on a case that involves an aspect of CSR difficult to 
handle by the typical company: cooperation among companies and 
eventual individual sacrifices for their common group good. Here we 
looked at pure information acts and showed that whether CSR forms 
of information conveyance from the single company will take place or 
not, hinged essentially on how the interests among the different com-
panies were aligned, and where small changes may decide whether 
cooperation among the companies was likely to occur or not. 
 
                                                 
69.  General Electric is generally considered to have been among the most ethically con-
cerned, large companies in the US. Nevertheless, while the company reported a world 
wide profit for 2010 at about $14.2 billion, it paid no taxes and received $3.2 billion in tax 
benefits. (Kocieniewski, 2011). This was not only a cyclical blip, but the outcome of sys-
tematic work of its tax department that has a staff of 975, instructed to treat the depart-
ment as a profit, not compliance center (ibid). 
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It is clear that CSR deals with corporate responsibility and ethics, not 
the ethics or charity expenditures made by individual members of any 
company leadership. Although they may have some individual leeway 
for more or less ethically motivated choices, these have to be made 
under the shadow of the duty to maximize profits. 
 
Under some theoretical conditions, such as free competition, that duty 
may be unproblematic from most ethical points of view, but otherwise 
profit maximization may lead private companies to choose deeply eth-
ically troubling, ranging from such traditional negative welfare effects 
as polluting to lying and fraud. Ideally, it is the task of public authori-
ties to regulate those so that it becomes difficult to make large gains to 
the company and large harm to the public from either lying or pollut-
ing. Whether the authorities are capable or motivated to do so, may 
often be an open question. Nevertheless, as long as one has to rely on 
profit maximizing as a major guiding principle for company leader-
ships, it remains difficult to believe that companies may solve such 
problems on any large scale basis on their own.  
 
One ends with the rather unexciting conclusion that the major corpo-
rate responsibility of private companies remains to supply individual 
goods and services as efficiently as possible while most of the im-
portant moral considerations and trade- offs will have to be left to the 
government as in the fictional world of free competition. If the com-
panies are able to internalize other ethical concerns in their behavior, 
it is a bonus, while a pretense of moral motivation where none is pre-
sent, may rather become a reason for ethical concern and not only for 
Kantians.  
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